WHITHER INTERNALISM? HOW INTERNALISTS SHOULD RESPOND TO THE EXTENDED MIND HYPOTHESIS
Metaphilosophy April 1, 2008 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2008.00535.x (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the extended mind hypothesis does not refute internalism and is entirely compatible with it. Contends that the assumption that EMH troubles internalists is based on a bad characterization of internalism, and proposes that this should prompt a reconsideration of how internalism is defined. |
Abstract
Abstract:A new position in the philosophy of mind has recently appeared: the extended mind hypothesis (EMH). Some of its proponents think the EMH, which says that a subject's mental states can extend into the local environment, shows that internalism is false. I argue that this is wrong. The EMH does not refute internalism; in fact, it necessarily does not do so. The popular assumption that the EMH spells trouble for internalists is premised on a bad characterization of the internalist thesis—albeit one that most internalists have adhered to. I show that internalism is entirely compatible with the EMH. This view should prompt us to reconsider the characterization of internalism, and in conclusion I make some brief remarks about how that project might proceed.