Metaphilosophy
September 23, 2026
Killian McGrath
Abstract The problem of consciousness remains the most intractable question in the philosophy of mind. Scientific approaches to consciousness, in their effort to provide a systematic account, impose determinate structures. This methodological necessity encounters a dilemma: it seeks to define what is never self‐identical. This paper considers Conscious Agent Theory (CAT) within this broader...
Metaphilosophy
2024
Alexandre Billon
AbstractAccording to a common philosophical intuition, the deep nature of things is hidden from us, and the world as we know it through perception and science is, just like a dream, shadows, or a computer simulation, somehow shallow and lacking in reality. This “intuition of unreality” clashes with a strong, but perhaps more naive, intuition to the effect that the world as we know it seems...
Metaphilosophy
October 1, 2012
J. M. Fritzman, Kristin Parvizian
Abstract: The nonmetaphysical interpretation ofHegel's philosophy asserts that the metaphysical reading is not credible and so his philosophy must be rationally reconstructed so as to elide its metaphysical aspects. This article shows that the thesis of the extended mind approaches the metaphysical reading, thereby undermining denials of its credibility and providing the resources to articulate...
Metaphilosophy
July 1, 2012
Paul R. Smart
Abstract: This article explores the notion of theWeb‐extended mind, which is the idea that the technological and informational elements of theWeb can sometimes serve as part of the mechanistic substrate that realizes human mental states and processes. It is argued that while current forms of theWeb may not be particularly suited to the realization ofWeb‐extended minds, new forms of user...
Metaphilosophy
April 1, 2011
Shaun Gallagher
11 citations
Abstract: This article poses a number of questions to Richard Shusterman concerning his concepts of somaesthetics and body consciousness in his book Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics. How do the concepts relate to the kind of forgetfulness of the body that can happen in expert performance? What is the nature of somatic reflection, and how is it different from...
Metaphilosophy
2011
Neil C. Manson
2 citations
Abstract: “Consciousness” seems to be a polysemic, ambiguous, term. Because of this, theorists have sought to distinguish the different kinds of phenomena that “consciousness” denotes, leading to a proliferation of terms for different kinds of consciousness. However, some philosophers—univocalists about consciousness—argue that “consciousness” is not polysemic or ambiguous. By drawing upon the...
Metaphilosophy
April 1, 2010
Selmer Bringsjord
Abstract: In the course of seeking an answer to the question “How do you know you are not a zombie?”Floridi (2005) issues an ingenious, philosophically rich challenge to artificial intelligence (AI) in the form of an extremely demanding version of the so‐called knowledge game (or “wise‐man puzzle,” or “muddy‐children puzzle”)—one that purportedly ensures that those who pass it are...
Metaphilosophy
April 1, 2008
Gary Bartlett
Abstract:A new position in the philosophy of mind has recently appeared: the extended mind hypothesis (EMH). Some of its proponents think the EMH, which says that a subject's mental states can extend into the local environment, shows that internalism is false. I argue that this is wrong. The EMH does not refute internalism; in fact, it necessarily does not do so. The popular assumption that the...