ISSN 0026-1068
3 papers in the library · 2 citations · publishing 2008-2011
Metaphilosophy 2011 Neil C. Manson 2 citations
Abstract: “Consciousness” seems to be a polysemic, ambiguous, term. Because of this, theorists have sought to distinguish the different kinds of phenomena that “consciousness” denotes, leading to a proliferation of terms for different kinds of consciousness. However, some philosophers—univocalists about consciousness—argue that “consciousness” is not polysemic or ambiguous. By drawing upon the...
Metaphilosophy April 1, 2010 Selmer Bringsjord
Abstract: In the course of seeking an answer to the question “How do you know you are not a zombie?”Floridi (2005) issues an ingenious, philosophically rich challenge to artificial intelligence (AI) in the form of an extremely demanding version of the so‐called knowledge game (or “wise‐man puzzle,” or “muddy‐children puzzle”)—one that purportedly ensures that those who pass it are...
Metaphilosophy April 1, 2008 Gary Bartlett
Abstract:A new position in the philosophy of mind has recently appeared: the extended mind hypothesis (EMH). Some of its proponents think the EMH, which says that a subject's mental states can extend into the local environment, shows that internalism is false. I argue that this is wrong. The EMH does not refute internalism; in fact, it necessarily does not do so. The popular assumption that the...