Extending the extended consciousness debate: perception, imagination, and the common kind assumption

Some philosophers argue that the sub-personal basis of perceptual experience can extend beyond the brain and body into the environment. Proponents of predictive processing counter that perception and imagination arise from the same internal mechanisms, so world-involvement is not essential for perception, supporting internalism. This article contends that the internalist argument relies on an implicit commitment to the common kind assumption—that perception and imagination are fundamentally the same kind of mental event—which does not follow from the predictive processing framework. Plausible alternative conceptions of the relationship exist that do not require internalist metaphysical conclusions. Therefore, internalists owe further clarification and argumentation to defend their position.

Study at a glance

Abstract

For some, the states and processes involved in the realisation of phenomenal consciousness are not confined to within the organismic boundaries of the experiencing subject. Instead, the sub-personal basis of perceptual experience can, and does, extend beyond the brain and body to implicate environmental elements through one’s interaction with the world. These claims are met by proponents of predictive processing, who propose that perception and imagination should be understood as a product of the same internal mechanisms. On this view, as visually imagining is not considered to be world-involving, it is assumed that world-involvement must not be essential for perception, and thus internalism about the sub-personal basis is true. However, the argument for internalism from the unity of perception and imagination relies for its strength on a questionable conception of the relationship between the two experiential states. I argue that proponents of the predictive approach are guilty of harbouring an implicit commitment to the common kind assumption which does not follow trivially from their framework. That is, the assumption that perception and imagination are of the same fundamental kind of mental event. I will argue that there are plausible alternative ways of conceiving of this relationship without drawing internalist metaphysical conclusions from their psychological theory. Thus, the internalist owes the debate clarification of this relationship and further argumentation to secure their position.