Rethinking neuroethics in the light of the extended mind thesis.

The extended mind thesis holds that mental states can extend beyond the skull into the environment. This article argues that the thesis has significant implications for neuroethics. It defends the extended mind thesis against criticisms and then argues that the thesis shows that interventions into the brain are not especially problematic just because they are internal. Instead, the thesis shifts neuroethics from asking whether to allow interventions into the mind to asking which interventions to allow and under what conditions. Because environmental interventions can count as mental interventions, the thesis dramatically expands the scope of neuroethics to include decisions about such environmental interventions.

Study at a glance

Abstract

The extended mind thesis is the claim that mental states extend beyond the skulls of the agents whose states they are. This seemingly obscure and bizarre claim has far-reaching implications for neuroethics, I argue. In the first half of this article, I sketch the extended mind thesis and defend it against criticisms. In the second half, I turn to its neuroethical implications. I argue that the extended mind thesis entails the falsity of the claim that interventions into the brain are especially problematic just because they are internal interventions, but that many objections to such interventions rely, at least in part, on this claim. Further, I argue that the thesis alters the focus of neuroethics, away from the question of whether we ought to allow interventions into the mind, and toward the question of which interventions we ought to allow and under what conditions. The extended mind thesis dramatically expands the scope of neuroethics: because interventions into the environment of agents can count as interventions into their minds, decisions concerning such interventions become questions for neuroethics.