The Elusive Extended Mind

For nearly two decades Andy Clark has championed the extended mind thesis, which holds that cognitive processes can extend beyond the brain into the environment. However, Clark restricts this extension to cognition itself, not consciousness. The chapter argues that Clark has not provided a clear definition of what a cognitive process is, relying instead on vague characterizations such as "cognition is as cognition does" or that cognition is "what supports intelligent behavior." This lack of precision, the author contends, makes the extended mind an elusive concept and undermines the thesis's ability to determine when cognition genuinely extends.

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Abstract

Abstract For nearly twenty years Andy Clark has been the chief architect and proponent of the thesis of extended mind. But it is only the cognitive processes in the mind that extend, according to Clark (not consciousness itself). However, when it comes to saying what a cognitive process is such that one can determine whether it does or does not extend, Clark is less forthcoming. He has offered a Dennettian “cognition is as cognition does.” He has offered that cognition is “what supports intelligent behavior.” In some cases he comes very close to asserting that we don’t really need to say what cognition is. This chapter explains why this all matters and why the failure to be more forthcoming makes the extended mind an elusive entity.