Explaining Phenomenal Consciousness. Does Conceivability Entail Possibility
M. Dumitru
May 13, 2013 DOI: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2013.04.366 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that a conceptual tension exists between the predominant physicalist view of the natural world and the apparent resistance of conscious subjective experience to physicalist explanation, presenting a dilemma: either keep a physicalist explanation or dramatically revise our conception of the natural world. |
Abstract
Abstract Explaining phenomenal consciousness may very well be the scientific and philosophical problem of our age. There is a conceptual tension which makes the task of giving a unitary explanation to the mind and to the physical world one of the most persistent and intriguing enigma. The predominant outlook about the natural world is of a physical kind. However, the mind and especially the conscious subjective experience do not seem to fit within this naturalist and physicalist explanation. It appears that we are caught in a dilemma, for we either stick to a physicalist explanation, or else we should figure out a dramatic change of our conception about the natural world.