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Reflexivity, Subjectivity, and the Constructed Self: A Buddhist Model

Matthew Mackenzie

Asian Philosophy July 3, 2015 DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2015.1078140 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Buddhism
Citations 13
Key points Argues that consciousness is reflexive or self-illuminating and necessarily involves minimal subjectivity, but that neither feature requires a self or ego as an entity. Proposes that what is normally called 'the self' is a complex, multi-layered 'I-making' process (ahaṁkāra) arising within the pre-egoic flow of subjective consciousness.

Abstract

The aim of this article is to take up three closely connected questions. First, does consciousness essentially involve subjectivity? Second, what is the connection, if any, between pre-reflective self-consciousness and subjectivity? And, third, does consciousness necessarily involve an ego or self? I will draw on the Yogācāra–Madhyamaka synthesis of Śāntarakṣita (eighth century common era) to develop an account of the relation between consciousness, subjectivity, and the self. I will argue, first, that phenomenal consciousness is reflexive or self-illuminating (svaprakāśya). Second, I will argue that consciousness necessarily involves minimal subjectivity. Third, I will argue that neither the reflexivity nor the subjectivity of consciousness implies that there is any entity such as the self or ego over and above reflexive consciousness. Fourth, I will argue that what we normally think of as ‘the self’ is best understood as a complex, multi-layered process (ahaṁkāra, ‘I-making’) that emerges within the pre-egoic flow of subjective consciousness.

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