The conscious self: ontology, epistemology and the mirror quest.

The self as the subject of experience is distinct from self-awareness, body image, or narrative identity. The authors argue that the self as the immediate subject cannot be dismissed as an illusion. They adapt Chalmers' framework for consciousness to formulate axioms for the self-concept and use a thought experiment called the "mirror quest" to show that the framework may need revision to account for the subject. This analysis leads to a novel position called "subjective nonreductive functionalism," which has implications for brain sciences as an epistemological model.

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Abstract

Here we address the notion of the self as the subject of experience, in contrast with its other popular meanings of a state of self-awareness, a body image, or a narrative center. In this perspective, the main player is not consciousness per se (the famous "hard problem"), but its subject. We start by showing that the self as the subject of immediate self-awareness cannot be conceived as an illusion. Then we formulate axioms of the self-concept based on the framework that Chalmers initially developed for consciousness. Using a thought experiments (the "mirror quest"), we show that this framework may require corrections in order to accommodate the subject. We analyze several possibilities that lead to a novel doctrine of "subjective nonreductive functionalism". As an epistemological model, this position has further important implications for brain sciences.