Embodiment and Phenomenal Qualities
Philosophical Topics 2011 DOI: 10.5840/philtopics201139111 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 5 |
| Key points | Argues that Husserl's concept of hyletic data, when revised to be fully embodied, can enrich the concept of enactive perception and address gaps in debates about qualia and phenomenal consciousness. |
Abstract
I argue that an older debate in phenomenology concerning Husserl’s notion of hyletic data can throw some light on contemporary debates about qualia and phenomenal consciousness. Both debates tend to ignore important considerations about bodily experience and how specific kinds of bodily experience can shape one’s consciousness of the world. A revised and fully embodied conception of hyletic experience enriches the concept of enactive perception.
Citations in the library
Cites 3
- Spreading the Joy? Why the Machinery of Consciousness is (Probably) Still in the Head Mind October 1, 2009
- Embodiment or Envatment?: Reflections on the Bodily Basis of Consciousness The MIT Press eBooks November 24, 2010
- Radical embodiment: neural dynamics and consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences October 1, 2001