The Mind–Body Problem in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty
Roberta Lanfredini
Mind, Values, and Metaphysics 2014 DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-04199-5_31 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Mind/body problem Qualia Leib in phenomenology Embodied mind Husserl and merleau-ponty |
| Key points | Argues that the material dimension of subjectivity, akin to qualia, is inseparable from embodiment in Husserl's phenomenology, yet Husserl's analogy between the experience–body link and the colour–extension relation fails to resolve how material body connects to qualitative mind. Proposes that Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on the material body reintroduces a natural but non-naturalistic perspective. |
Abstract
There is a material dimension of subjectivity that constitutes a conscious feature profoundly different from the representational feature. The former corresponds in many respects to what for the contemporary philosopher of mind is the qualitative mind or authentic consciousness (qualia). In the Husserlian phenomenology, non-intentional consciousness is also characterized by its inevitable conjunction with embodiment. However, in Husserl, there are two ways of understanding the living body: the matter of the body and the body extension. In some passages, Husserl suggests that the relationship between the stream of experiences and the body extension can be read as a case of a material a priori thoroughly analogous to the essential link between colour and extension. This analogy, however, leaves the problem of the relationship between material body and qualitative mind completely unresolved. Merleau-Ponty reconsiders the material concept of body as essential and, in doing so, he reintroduces a natural (but not naturalistic) point of view in the phenomenological perspective.