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Affectivity And Time: Towards A Phenomenology Of Embodied Time-Consciousness

Marek Pokropski

June 1, 2015 DOI: 10.1515/slgr-2015-0026 (opens in new tab) via Semantic Scholar

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Time-consciousness is primarily constituted in the dynamic experience of bodily feelings, not in higher-level cognitive acts. Drawing on Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, the article argues that the temporal flow of consciousness originates in prereflective, non-intentional bodily self-affection and affective-kinaesthetic experience. To clarify this pre-phenomenal temporality, the author analyzes the dynamics of bodily self-affection and supplements Husserl's account with Daniel Stern's psychological concept of "vitality affect." The best way to understand the pre-phenomenal dynamics of bodily feelings is through the notion of rhythm.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Keywords Psychology Philosophy
Key finding Argues that time-consciousness is primarily constituted in the dynamic experience of bodily feelings, and that rhythm best captures the pre-phenomenal dynamics of bodily self-affection.

Abstract

Abstract In the article, I develop some ideas introduced by Edmund Husserl concerning time-consciousness and embodiment. However, I do not discuss the Husserlian account of consciousness of time in its full scope. I focus on the main ideas of the phenomenology of time and the problem of bodily sensations and their role in the constitution of consciousness of time. I argue that time-consciousness is primarily constituted in the dynamic experience of bodily feelings. In the first part, I outline the main ideas of Husserl’s early phenomenology of consciousness of time. In the second part, I introduce the phenomenological account of bodily feelings and describe how it evolved in Husserl’s philosophy. Next, I discuss the idea of bodily self-affection and the affective-kinaesthetic origin of consciousness’ temporal flow. In order to better understand this “pre-phenomenal temporality”, I analyse the dynamics of non-intentional, prereflective bodily self-affection. In the third part, I try to complement Husserl’s account by describing the specific dynamics of bodily experience. In order to do so, I appeal to Daniel Stern’s psychological account of dynamic bodily experience, which he calls the “vitality affect”. I argue that the best way to understand the pre-phenomenal dynamics of bodily feelings is in terms of the notion of rhythm.

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