Consideraciones sobre la percepción desde la perspectiva enactiva
Ana Lorena Dominguez Rojas
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology April 28, 2020 DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n1p29 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that enactivism offers a more promising account of the phenomenal character of perception than representationalism or disjunctivism. |
Abstract
This article reviews the enactive approach to perception, which defends the role of objects, the subject and the environment in the configuration of the phenomenal character of perception, that is, the qualitative dimension of experience. Initially the case of hallucination and its implications in the understanding of the phenomenal character of perception is retaken. Then, two positions within analytic philosophy of perception, representationalism and disjunctivism, are critically explored. Finally, enactivism is presented as a more promising alternative.
Citations in the library
Cites 7
- The enactive approach Pragmatics & Cognition July 26, 2011
- Consciousness Revisited The MIT Press eBooks December 12, 2008
- Bodily skill and internal representation in sensorimotor perception Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences March 16, 2017
- The unity of hallucinations Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences May 4, 2010
- Enactive neuroscience, the direct perception hypothesis, and the socially extended mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2015
and 2 more in the library