Consideraciones sobre la percepción desde la perspectiva enactiva
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology April 28, 2020 DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n1p29 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that enactivism offers a more promising account of the phenomenal character of perception than representationalism or disjunctivism. |
Abstract
This article reviews the enactive approach to perception, which defends the role of objects, the subject and the environment in the configuration of the phenomenal character of perception, that is, the qualitative dimension of experience. Initially the case of hallucination and its implications in the understanding of the phenomenal character of perception is retaken. Then, two positions within analytic philosophy of perception, representationalism and disjunctivism, are critically explored. Finally, enactivism is presented as a more promising alternative.