What to say to a skeptical metaphysician: a defense manual for cognitive and behavioral scientists.

A recent metaphysical critique argues that functionalism in cognitive science—the view that mental states are defined by what they do rather than by their physical makeup—makes mental processes epiphenomenal (causally impotent) and that reductionism is needed to restore causal significance. The authors contend that returning to reductionism would devastate cognitive and behavioral sciences by invalidating most existing work and imposing unworkable constraints. They further argue that the metaphysical challenge fails because it reifies two distinct notions of causality (scientific and metaphysical) and equivocates between them. Once these notions are properly distinguished, functionalism faces no serious philosophical threat, and the choice between reducing minds or accepting causal impotence is false. The critique relies on a naïve view of physics and its relation to metaphysics.

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Abstract

A wave of recent work in metaphysics seeks to undermine the anti-reductionist, functionalist consensus of the past few decades in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. That consensus apparently legitimated a focus on what systems do, without necessarily and always requiring attention to the details of how systems are constituted. The new metaphysical challenge contends that many states and processes referred to by functionalist cognitive scientists are epiphenomenal. It further contends that the problem lies in functionalism itself, and that, to save the causal significance of mind, it is necessary to re-embrace reductionism. We argue that the prescribed return to reductionism would be disastrous for the cognitive and behavioral sciences, requiring the dismantling of most existing achievements and placing intolerable restrictions on further work. However, this argument fails to answer the metaphysical challenge on its own terms. We meet that challenge by going on to argue that the new metaphysical skepticism about functionalist cognitive science depends on reifying two distinct notions of causality (one primarily scientific, the other metaphysical), then equivocating between them. When the different notions of causality are properly distinguished, it is clear that functionalism is in no serious philosophical trouble, and that we need not choose between reducing minds or finding them causally impotent. The metaphysical challenge to functionalism relies, in particular, on a naïve and inaccurate conception of the practice of physics, and the relationship between physics and metaphysics.