Burge's Dualism
The Waning of Materialism March 25, 2010 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0010 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that compositional materialism about representational mental events is false if a 'mathematical archangel' cannot discern the causally salient neural event underlying a representational event without prior knowledge of the mental event and its causal relations, suggesting Burge's dualist doubts could be empirically confirmed. |
Abstract
AbstractDualist themes in Burge's philosophy of mind are gathered and articulated. Burge's anti-individualism yields an argument against token-identity theory; his reflections on mental causation have a dualist flavor; and he doubts that the relation of mental events to neural events is one of composition or constitution. This chapter argues that compositional materialism about representational mental events would be false just in case a ‘mathematical archangel’, starting from a base of fundamental material facts, could not discern as causally salient the neural event underlying a representational event prior to identifying the representational mental event as such and its causal relations. Burge's doubts about neural composition of the mental could thus be empirically confirmed.