Materialism Does Not Save the Phenomena—and the Alternative Which Does
The Waning of Materialism March 25, 2010 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0021 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the self's location is a 'center of perspective' not identical to the body, supported by phantom sensations; contends that blurred vision reveals non-physical qualitative properties; and proposes that the self's endurance is explained by psychophysical causation. |
Abstract
AbstractThis chapter offers a version of Cartesian dualism that draws on the resources of a Husserlian account of intentionality. For example, it argues that ‘I can locate myself at the point in space from which I am looking at the world (my ‘center of perspective’)’. It relies on empirical phenomenology to show that this location that does not correspond to my body or any part of it. Phantom sensations provide confirming evidence. Next, the chapter uses the example of blurred (versus sharp) vision to provide evidence of qualitative properties that cannot be instantiated within the physical world. Finally, it argues that the self's endurance through calls for explanation in terms of patterns of psychophysical causation or interaction.