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Defining the states of consciousness.

P Tassi, A Muzet

Neuroscience and biobehavioral reviews March 2001 DOI: 10.1016/s0149-7634(01)00006-9 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that consciousness, attention, vigilance, arousal, and alertness should be treated as distinct functional entities rather than conflated, and proposes separate definitions for each. Contends that consciousness during wake and sleep may involve different mechanisms, and that modified states can be induced by self-training or drug intake.

Abstract

Consciousness remains an elusive concept due to the difficulty to define what has been regarded for many years as a subjective experience, therefore irrelevant for scientific study. Recent development in this field of research has allowed to provide some new insight to a possible way to define consciousness. Going through the extensive literature in this domain, several perspectives are proposed to define this concept. (1) Consciousness and Attention may not reflect the same process. (2) Consciousness during wake and sleep may not involve the same mechanisms. (3) Besides physiological states of consciousness, human beings can experience modified states of consciousness either by self-training (transcendental meditation, hypnosis, etc.) or by drug intake (hallucinogens, anaesthetics, etc.). Altogether, we address the question of a more precise terminology, given the theoretical weight words can convey. To this respect, we propose different definitions for concepts like consciousness, vigilance, arousal and alertness as candidates to separate functional entities.

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