Metaethical implications of illusionism
Омский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность" April 6, 2026 DOI: 10.25206/2542-0488-2026-11-1-84-100 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Illusionism Physicalism Materialism Phenomenal consciousness Qualia Sentience Intrinsic value |
| Key points | Argues that no existing solution to illusionism's normative problem is satisfactory, and proposes two alternative solutions that either weaken illusionism or accept antirealist metaethical implications. |
Abstract
According to illusionism, there is no phenomenal consciousness, only an illusion of it. Since the phenomenal character of experience plays an important role in explaining and justifying its normative status, illusionism faces a normative problem. The problem is that illusionism, by denying phenomenal experience, potentially undermines our moral commitments. In this article, I defend the normative problem and consider solutions to it proposed by François Kammerer, Keith Frankish, Artem Besedin, Maxim Gorbachev, Artem Iunusov, and Taras Tarasenko. As I show, none of these solutions is satisfactory. I conclude by offering two alternative solutions that either weaken illusionism or accept antirealist implications for metaethics.