A reply to “the unfolding argument”: Beyond functionalism/behaviorism and towards a truer science of causal structural theories of consciousness

A theory of consciousness must address both the causal structure of a system and the structure of subjective experience (phenomenal structure). Doerig et al. argue that theories based on physical brain structure are unscientific and prefer input-output descriptions, which the authors critique as extreme methodological behaviorism. The authors clarify ambiguities in Doerig et al.'s argument, reject three of their four premises, and explain how causal structure theories of consciousness can be empirical and falsifiable. They propose that consciousness science should derive phenomenal structure from reports and search for isomorphism between physical and phenomenal structures.

Study at a glance

Abstract

In their recent article, the unfolding argument, Doerig et al argue that a theory of consciousness cannot be based in the characterization of the physical structure of the brain. They argue that such theories must be “either false or outside the realm of science”. Instead, they prefer theories of consciousness based only on “input-output” descriptions. By their implicit treatment of phenomenal structure as impossible to study, the authors seem to be advocating for a new mode of extreme methodological behaviorism. We take issue with their view, and describe an alternate approach to consciousness science. We clarify some ambiguities in Doerig et al’s argument, critiquing three of their four premises, leading to different conclusions. We then explain what makes causal structure theories of consciousness empirical and falsifiable. Specifically, we propose that consciousness science must work on ways to consider phenomenal structure - i.e. to derive the structure of experience from reports, and to search for isomorphism between physical and phenomenal structures. In essence, we argue that to really take consciousness seriously as an object of study, it is unavoidable that both phenomenal structure and the causal structure of a system must be central to any theory of consciousness.