Algorithmic structure of experience and the unfolding argument

The unfolding argument challenges causal structure theories of consciousness by requiring that a theory specify which physical systems are conscious and which are not. This paper examines how the algorithmic information theory of consciousness (KT), which links subjective experience to the structure of a computational system, is affected by this argument. Considering computational hierarchies and limited physical resources, the authors introduce novel considerations that may extend the unfolding argument, suggesting that the argument's requirements may be more complex when applied to theories that rely on algorithmic information and computational structure.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Here we discuss the impact of issues recently raised about theories of consciousness in light of the so-called "unfolding argument" and the more general falsification requirements on causal structure theories of consciousness. These arguments potentially affect the algorithmic information theory of consciousness (KT), where the structure of a computational system is seen to shape subjective experience. We discuss this from the point of view of computational hierarchies and limited physical resources to point to some novel considerations in the unfolding argument and its extensions.