On the relevance of folk intuitions: a commentary on Talbot.
Justin Sytsma, Edouard Machery
Consciousness and Cognition June 1, 2012 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.04.003 (opens in new tab) via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe authors previously argued that ordinary people do not conceive of subjective experiences as having phenomenal qualities, which undermines a common justification for the hard problem of consciousness. Here, they respond to Talbot's criticism of their earlier argument, defending their position against the challenge.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that ordinary people do not conceive of subjective experiences as having phenomenal qualities, which challenges a common justification for the hard problem of consciousness. |
Abstract
In previous work, we presented evidence suggesting that ordinary people do not conceive of subjective experiences as having phenomenal qualities. We then argued that these findings undermine a common justification given for the reality of the hard problem of consciousness. In a thought-provoking article, Talbot has challenged our argument. In this article, we respond to his criticism.