4 papers in the library · 78 citations · publishing 2010-2021
Cognition October 1, 2021 Eugen Fischer, Justin Sytsma 22 citations
In philosophical thought experiments, as in ordinary discourse, our understanding of verbal case descriptions is enriched by automatic comprehension inferences. Such inferences have us routinely infer what else is also true of the cases described. We consider how such routine inferences from polysemous words can generate zombie intuitions: intuitions that are 'killed' (defeated) by contextual...
Wiley interdisciplinary reviews. Cognitive science November 1, 2014 Justin Sytsma 17 citations
Many philosophers and brain scientists hold that explaining consciousness is one of the major outstanding problems facing modern science today. One type of consciousness in particular-phenomenal consciousness-is thought to be especially problematic. The reasons given for believing that this phenomenon exists in the first place, however, often hinge on the claim that its existence is simply...
Consciousness and Cognition June 1, 2012 Justin Sytsma, Edouard Machery
In previous work, we presented evidence suggesting that ordinary people do not conceive of subjective experiences as having phenomenal qualities. We then argued that these findings undermine a common justification given for the reality of the hard problem of consciousness. In a thought-provoking article, Talbot has challenged our argument. In this article, we respond to his criticism.
Philosophy Compass July 20, 2010 Justin Sytsma 39 citations
Abstract In studying folk psychology, cognitive and developmental psychologists have mainly focused on how people conceive of non‐experiential states, such as beliefs and desires. As a result, we know very little about how the non‐philosophers (or the folk) understand the mental states that philosophers typically classify as being phenomenally conscious. In particular, it is not known whether...