Responses to the Commentaries to “Rethinking Subjectivity: The Social Roots of Consciousness”

Abstract

This paper addresses commentaries on “Rethinking Subjectivity: The Social Roots of Consciousness”. In response to Marraffa-Meini, the author defends his view by arguing that empirical evidence supports the emergence of social cognition faculties, such as motor mirroring and emotional contagion, before higher-level cognitive processes like deception. The author acknowledges the critique of the “mindreading priority account” but maintains that a single mindreading system better explains self-consciousness. Responding to Eugeny Loginov, the author clarifies that while consciousness serves an adaptive role, it does not imply adaptationism. The author agrees that consciousness may have multiple evolutionary origins but emphasizes the focus on self-consciousness as a social cognitive tool. In addressing Artem Besedin’s critique, the author concedes that the tension between phenomenology and functionalism is valid but argues that the problem of phenomenology is empirical rather than principled. Responding to Max Cappuccio, the author acknowledges the potential compatibility of the theory with enactivism, particularly in avoiding the reduction of mental life to motor dimensions. Finally, in response to Keith Frankish, the author agrees that the “subjective side of subjectivity” may be illusory in some sense and that science, while limited in explaining individual experiences, can be complemented by other disciplines to develop a more nuanced understanding of consciousness.