Tertium datur?Reflections on Owen Flanagan'sconsciousness reconsidered
Philosophical Psychology 1995 DOI: 10.1080/09515089508573146 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 2 |
| Key points | Argues that Owen Flanagan's intermediate position on qualia, between Dennett's dismissal and the view that qualia block naturalism, has serious problems, as shown by classic disputes such as the inverted spectrum, Jackson's thought experiment, Hindsight, and epiphenomenalism. Proposes a less vulnerable variant of the middle ground. |
Abstract
Owen Flanagan's arguments concerning qualia constitute an intermediate position between Dennett's “disqualification” of qualia and the thesis that qualia represent an insurmountable obstacle to constructive naturalism. This middle ground is potentially attractive, but it is shown to have serious problems. This is brought out via consideration of several classic areas of dispute connected with qualia, including the inverted spectrum, Frank Jackson's thought experiment, Hindsight, and epiphenomenalism. An attempt is made to formulate the basis for a less vulnerable variant on the “middle ground”.