An active inference model of conscious access: How cognitive action selection reconciles the results of report and no-report paradigms.
Christopher J. Whyte, Jakob Hohwy, Ryan Smith
Current Research in Neurobiology 2022 DOI: 10.1016/j.crneur.2022.100036 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Computational simulation Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Active inference Conscious access Consciousness No-report paradigms Prefrontal cortex |
| Citations | 21 |
| Key points | No-report paradigm results do not necessarily contradict cognitive theories of consciousness, as prefrontal cortex activity on visible trials still crosses the threshold for reportability even without reporting demands. |
Abstract
Cognitive theories of consciousness, such as global workspace theory and higher-order theories, posit that frontoparietal circuits play a crucial role in conscious access. However, recent studies using no-report paradigms have posed a challenge to cognitive theories by demonstrating conscious accessibility in the apparent absence of prefrontal cortex (PFC) activation. To address this challenge, this paper presents a computational model of conscious access, based upon active inference, that treats working memory gating as a cognitive action. We simulate a visual masking task and show that late P3b-like event-related potentials (ERPs), and increased PFC activity, are induced by the working memory demands of self-report generation. When reporting demands are removed, these late ERPs vanish and PFC activity is reduced. These results therefore reproduce, and potentially explain, results from no-report paradigms. However, even without reporting demands, our model shows that simulated PFC activity on visible stimulus trials still crosses the threshold for reportability - maintaining the link between PFC and conscious access. Therefore, our simulations show that evidence provided by no-report paradigms does not necessarily contradict cognitive theories of consciousness.