Is predictive processing a theory of perceptual consciousness?
April 1, 2021 DOI: 10.1016/j.newideapsych.2020.100837 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Predictive Processing theory cannot explain the transition from unconscious to conscious perception in its proprietary terms, and that its explanations address only the preconditions of conscious perception, not its material substrate. |
Abstract
Abstract Predictive Processing theory, hotly debated in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy, promises to explain a number of perceptual and cognitive phenomena in a simple and elegant manner. In some of its versions, the theory is ambitiously advertised as a new theory of conscious perception. The task of this paper is to assess whether this claim is realistic. We will be arguing that the Predictive Processing theory cannot explain the transition from unconscious to conscious perception in its proprietary terms. The explanations offered by PP theorists mostly concern the preconditions of conscious perception, leaving the genuine material substrate of consciousness untouched.