Is predictive processing a theory of perceptual consciousness?
April 1, 2021 DOI: 10.1016/j.newideapsych.2020.100837 (opens in new tab) via Semantic Scholar
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractPredictive Processing theory, which aims to explain perception and cognition simply, is sometimes promoted as a new theory of conscious perception. This paper argues that the theory cannot account for the shift from unconscious to conscious perception using its own concepts. The explanations provided by Predictive Processing theorists primarily address the prerequisites for conscious perception, not the actual physical basis of consciousness itself.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Psychology Philosophy |
| Key finding | Argues that Predictive Processing theory cannot explain the transition from unconscious to conscious perception in its proprietary terms, and that its explanations address only the preconditions of conscious perception, not its material substrate. |
Abstract
Abstract Predictive Processing theory, hotly debated in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy, promises to explain a number of perceptual and cognitive phenomena in a simple and elegant manner. In some of its versions, the theory is ambitiously advertised as a new theory of conscious perception. The task of this paper is to assess whether this claim is realistic. We will be arguing that the Predictive Processing theory cannot explain the transition from unconscious to conscious perception in its proprietary terms. The explanations offered by PP theorists mostly concern the preconditions of conscious perception, leaving the genuine material substrate of consciousness untouched.