Skip to content

The metaphysics of perception: enactivism, phenomenology and information.

David Rose

PsyArXiv October 6, 2021 preprint DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/d83fv (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Topics Philosophy of mind
Citations 2
Key points Argues that a multi-level, non-reductive metaphysics like Informational Structural Realism is needed to clarify the metaphysical status of enactivism.

Abstract

Enactivism is a major research programme in the philosophy of perception. Yet its metaphysical status is unclear, since it is claimed to avoid both idealism and realism yet still has aspects of both within it. One attempt to solve this conundrum is based on the fusion of enactivism with phenomenology and the mathematical concept of symmetry breaking (Moss Brender, 2013). I suggest this is not entirely successful and propose it needs the addition of a multi-level, non-reductive metaphysics (for example, Informational Structural Realism). The processes we commonly call ‘perception’ are causal transfers of information at certain levels in the hierarchy of meaningful structures that comprise physical reality. Phenomenologists could use the word ‘perception’ metaphorically across all levels, although realists need not do so.

Comparable studies

Other theoretical and historical papers on philosophy of mind, most cited first.

Citations in the library

Explore topics