Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Perception
June 10, 2021 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198853534.003.0011 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the relationship between philosophical and scientific theories of perception is not straightforward, given the many subdisciplines and methodologies involved, and proposes to examine how the 'Metaphysical debate' among naïve realists and intentionalists relates to the 'Psychological debate' between ecological and constructivist theorists. |
Abstract
What is the relationship between philosophical and scientific theories of perception? We should not expect there to be a straightforward answer to this question, not least because of the multitude of subdisciplines and methodologies involved. The philosophy of perception, for example, includes research on the epistemic role of perceptual states, the subjective qualities of perceptual experience, and the metaphysical relation between perceivers and the world. Research in the science of perception involves computational models of perceptual algorithms, neurobiological models of perceptual systems, and behavioural models of the relation between perception, attention, and action. In this paper, I will be narrowing my focus to the relationship between two particular debates about perception: the debate between naïve realists, intentionalists, and others, which I will refer to as the ‘Metaphysical debate’, and the debate between ecological theorists and constructivist theorists, which I will refer to as the ‘Psychological debate’.