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Idealism and materialism in perception.

David Rose, Dora Brown

Perception 2015 DOI: 10.1068/p7927 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Citations 17
Key points Argues that Koenderink's metaphysical idealism is flawed due to dualism and foundationalism, and that objective material reality exists, with phenomenology and cognitive science being complementary.

Abstract

Koenderink (2014, Perception, 43, 1-6) has said most Perception readers are deluded, because they believe an 'All Seeing Eye' observes an objective reality. We trace the source of Koenderink's assertion to his metaphysical idealism, and point to two major weaknesses in his position-namely, its dualism and foundationalism. We counter with arguments from modern philosophy of science for the existence of an objective material reality, contrast Koenderink's enactivism to his idealism, and point to ways in which phenomenology and cognitive science are complementary and not mutually exclusive.