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Phenomenology and phenomenalism: a comment on Chan and Chen’s “physical nature lives!”

Chang Liu

Asian Journal of Philosophy June 18, 2026 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-026-00419-7 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Phenomenalism Husserl Perceptual experiences
Key points Argues that phenomenology does not lead to phenomenalism, since perceptual experience is directly directed toward objects rather than sensory data.

Abstract

This commentary examines Chan and Chen’s ( 2025 ) argument for the compatibility between phenomenology and naturalism, focusing on their response to the Argument from Sparse Bundles. It argues that the target article involves a shift in the meaning of experience, but that this shift can be understood as an interpretation of a specifically phenomenalist version of ASB. Drawing on Husserl’s own text, the commentary further argues that phenomenology does not lead to phenomenalism, since perceptual experience is directly directed toward objects rather than sensory data. Its aim is therefore to strengthen, rather than challenge, the target article’s central argument.

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