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Rethinking Nature: Phenomenology and a Non-reductionist Cognitive Science

Shaun Gallagher

Australasian Philosophical Review April 3, 2018 DOI: 10.1080/24740500.2018.1552074 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Citations 71
Key points Argues that the debate over whether phenomenology can contribute to cognitive science, and whether it can be naturalized, depends on a classic scientific conception of nature. Rethinking nature itself, as enactivist phenomenological approaches propose, undermines the reductionist program and redefines what naturalizing phenomenology means.

Abstract

Resistance to the idea that phenomenology can be relevant to cognitive scientific explanation has faced two objections advanced, respectively, from both sides of the issue: from the scientific perspective it has been suggested that phenomenology, understood as an account of first-person experience, is ultimately reducible to cognitive neuroscientific explanation; and from a phenomenological perspective it has been argued that phenomenology cannot be naturalized. In this context it makes sense to consider that the notion of scientific reduction is linked to a classic scientific conception of nature. I argue that if properly understood, the proposal to rethink the concept of nature itself, in enactivist phenomenological approaches, undermines the reductionist program and redefines what it means for phenomenology to be naturalized.

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