Skip to content

Naturalizing Phenomenology: A Must Have?

Liliana Albertazzi

Frontiers in Psychology October 22, 2018 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01933 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Naturalization Consciousness Experimental phenomenology First person account
Key points Argues that Husserl's original phenomenological stance is deeper, clearer, and more advanced than most contemporary 'naturalizing phenomenology' proposals, and that experimental phenomenology shows how phenomenology can be naturalized without destroying its guiding assumptions. Discusses requirements for scientifically explaining subjective experience, including the nature of stimuli, their variables, and their manipulation by properly phenomenological methods.

Abstract

Quite a few cognitive scientists are working toward a naturalization of phenomenology. Looking more closely at the relevant literature, however, the 'naturalizing phenomenology' proposals show the presence of different conceptions, assumptions, and formalisms, further differentiated by different philosophical and/or scientific concerns. This paper shows that the original Husserlian stance is deeper, clearer and more advanced than most supposed contemporary improvements. The recent achievements of experimental phenomenology show how to 'naturalize' phenomenology without destroying the guiding assumptions of phenomenology. The requirements grounding the scientific explanation of subjective experience are discussed, such as the nature of the stimuli, their variables, and their manipulation by properly phenomenological methods.

Comparable studies

Other theoretical and historical papers on philosophy of mind, most cited first.

Citations in the library

Explore topics