Asian Journal of Philosophy
September 16, 2026
Christopher Jude McCarroll
Abstract In the introduction to his major work of philosophy, Mind and Matter , Henri Bergson declares that both spirit and matter exist, and that we can determine the precise relation between them through the study of memory. More than a century later, Yasushi Hirai takes up this project and outlines an original and distinct interpretation and development of the Bergsonian approach to episodic...
Asian Journal of Philosophy
August 5, 2026
Donovan Wishon
Abstract This paper critically examines Haoying Liu’s recent challenge to Russellian monism (RM), often understood as the view that (1) physics describes natural phenomena entirely in structural terms; (2) such phenomena possess intrinsic characters, or quiddities, that constitute or ground what physics describes structurally; and (3) phenomenal consciousness is constituted, at least in part,...
Asian Journal of Philosophy
June 18, 2026
Chang Liu
This commentary examines Chan and Chen’s ( 2025 ) argument for the compatibility between phenomenology and naturalism, focusing on their response to the Argument from Sparse Bundles. It argues that the target article involves a shift in the meaning of experience, but that this shift can be understood as an interpretation of a specifically phenomenalist version of ASB. Drawing on Husserl’s own...
Asian Journal of Philosophy
June 17, 2026
Kshitish Sharma, Gyan Prakash
This paper explores the metaphysics of consciousness through the lens of Mādhva Gauḍīya Vedānta, a Hindu philosophical tradition within Caitanya Vaiṣṇavism. It primarily examines how this school’s concepts relate to contemporary cosmopsychism. While resonating with cosmopsychist views of universal consciousness, the Gauḍīya perspective maintains a dualist metaphysics. It posits the jīvātmā as...
Asian Journal of Philosophy
June 1, 2026
Haoying Liu
Russellian monism (RM) is regarded by some philosophers as a promising approach to address the mind-body problem. However, this paper argues that RM suffers from a deep epistemological limitation: its core theoretical elements—namely quiddity (the fundamental intrinsic nature of physical entities) and the factors postulated to explain macro-level consciousness—are unknowable. This dual...
Asian Journal of Philosophy
February 10, 2026
N. Osborn
A version of panpsychism emerges from a critical overview of the metaphysics of properties. The “powerful qualities theory,” according to which all concrete properties are equiprimordially powerful and qualitative, enjoys a general advantage over other major theories of properties. But it faces some issues. Chief is the Collapse Argument: the powerful qualities theory struggles to define...
Asian Journal of Philosophy
February 5, 2026
Walter Veit
Abstract Goldstein and Kirk–Giannini have recently argued that artificial language agents can possess well-being in the absence of phenomenal consciousness. Here, I challenge their position, contending that their arguments fail to establish that consciousness is dispensable for well-being. Moreover, their arguments generate counterintuitive implications that are more problematic than those they...
Asian Journal of Philosophy
January 15, 2026
I-Jan Wang
Abstract Consciousness studies have relied on the subject’s remembering capacity as the primary tool for identifying and measuring selfless states, i.e., conscious states without self-consciousness. This paper critically examines whether memory can serve such a role. After outlining the requirements that remembering must meet when deployed in studies of selfless consciousness, I evaluate its...
Asian Journal of Philosophy
January 16, 2025
Kohei Yanagawa, Hiroshi Matsui
1 citation
In psychology, the principle of “Behaviorism” has a negative connotation. The ascription of the philosophical stance as “behaviorist” is usually nuanced with criticism, and those labeled behaviorists often deny it (For example, Gallagher says, “But then, a surprise! Barrett also wants to recruit the behaviorists, and specifically, B. F. Skinner. Is this “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” type...
Asian Journal of Philosophy
2022
Declan Smithies
1 citation
I reply to my critics in this symposium on my book, The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (Oxford University Press, 2019).