The Transcendental Argument for Universal Mineness: A Critique
Daniel Wehinger
Review of Philosophy and Psychology November 22, 2022 DOI: 10.1007/s13164-022-00658-6 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Argument complex analysis Consciousness Transcendental number Epistemology Argument map Metaphysics |
| Key points | Argues that the transcendental argument for universal mineness fails to substantiate an essential connection between phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness. |
Abstract
Abstract The claim that phenomenal consciousness essentially involves self-consciousness, in the sense of mineness , has gained momentum in recent years. In this paper, I discuss the main non-phenomenological, theoretical argument for this claim: the so-called “transcendental argument” for universal mineness (Zahavi 2018, p. 711), which, in essence, corresponds to Shoemaker’s critique of the perceptual model of self-consciousness. I point out the potential of the transcendental argument, but most importantly its limitations. And I show that, even if successful, the argument cannot vindicate the claim of an essential connection between phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness. Since the transcendental argument is depicted as the “central argument” for universal mineness (Zahavi 2018, p. 711), I contend that, in view of its failure, the claim that all of my experiences have to be given to me as mine , all of your experiences have to be given to you as yours , etc., appears insufficiently substantiated. The idea that there is an essential connection between phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness must be called into question.
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| The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. | 2013 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
Citations in the library
Cites 8
- On a confusion about a function of consciousness Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995
- Phenomenal Consciousness Cambridge University Press eBooks September 28, 2000
- Psychedelics, Meditation, and Self-Consciousness Frontiers in Psychology September 4, 2018
- I Me Mine: on a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2017
- Thought insertion and disturbed for-me-ness (minimal selfhood) in schizophrenia. Consciousness and Cognition September 1, 2019
and 3 more in the library