For-me-ness: a critical assessment of the phenomenal mineness thesis.
Roberto Sá Pereira
Cognitive Processing August 4, 2026 DOI: 10.1007/s10339-026-01383-z (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | For-me-ness Self-awareness Self-consciousness |
| Key points | Argues that the for-me-ness thesis lacks evidential support beyond the phenomenological descriptions it interprets, and that phenomena like depersonalization, schizophrenia, infancy, and autism are better explained without positing for-me-ness. |
Abstract
This paper examines the claim that the phenomenal "for-me-ness" is the core feature of every conscious experience. Any conscious episode is intrinsically given as mine, and this mineness, while non-reflective and non-cognitive, belongs to the personal and phenomenal level. The compatibility checks for the for-me-ness thesis comes from cases such as depersonalization, schizophrenia, infancy and autism. I argue that this view lacks evidential support beyond the phenomenological descriptions it was built to interpret and that these phenomena receive better explanations that do not require positing for-me-ness.
Citations in the library
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and 4 more in the library