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Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood.

Olaf Blanke, Thomas Metzinger

Trends in Cognitive Sciences December 6, 2008 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.003 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Humans Illusions Self concept Consciousness Body image Models, psychological
Key points Argues that existing research on body perception and self-consciousness has concentrated on central representations of body parts and actions while neglecting the global, unitary character of self-consciousness, the 'I' of experience and behavior. Proposes that conceptual clarifications and recent evidence from neurology and cognitive science offer a new entry point for systematically studying the minimally sufficient conditions for a phenomenal self and the necessary conditions for self-consciousness in any type of system.

Abstract

We highlight the latest research on body perception and self-consciousness, but argue that despite these achievements, central aspects have remained unexplored, namely, global aspects of bodily self-consciousness. Researchers investigated central representations of body parts and actions involving these, but neglected the global and unitary character of self-consciousness, the 'I' of experience and behaviour. We ask, what are the minimally sufficient conditions for the appearance of a phenomenal self, that is, the fundamental conscious experience of being someone? What are necessary conditions for self-consciousness in any type of system? We offer conceptual clarifications, discuss recent empirical evidence from neurology and cognitive science and argue that these findings offer a new entry point for the systematic study of global and more fundamental aspects of self-consciousness.

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