Prospects for the Scientific Study of Phenomenal Consciousness
Thinking about Consciousness April 25, 2002 DOI: 10.1093/0199243824.003.0008 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that phenomenal concepts are too vague to determinately refer to specific material states, limiting how far brain research can resolve the hard problem of consciousness. |
Abstract
Abstract Many scientists hope that brain research will identify the material nature of conscious states. Papineau argues that when it comes to the “hard problem” of identifying the material referents of phenomenal concepts, scientific research can only take us so far. This is because phenomenal concepts are vague and do not point determinately to specific material states. This chapter also looks at Higher‐Order Thought (HOT) and representational accounts of consciousness.