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Inner Acquaintance Theories of Consciousness

Anna Giustina

September 17, 2024 DOI: 10.1093/9780198924159.003.0010 (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Most philosophical theories of consciousness explain it through representation, debating whether representing something is sufficient (first-order representationalism) or requires further meta-representation (higher-order and self-representationalism). This chapter presents an alternative, the Inner Acquaintance Theory (IAT), which explains consciousness not by representation but by a direct epistemic and metaphysical relation of acquaintance. On IAT, a mental state is conscious when its subject is acquainted with it. The chapter develops IAT's details, illustrates its explanatory power, and proposes it as a plausible alternative to representational theories.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Keywords Consciousness Epistemology Representation politics Metaphysics Psychology
Citations 15
Key finding Proposes that consciousness is explained by a direct relation of acquaintance rather than by representation, offering the Inner Acquaintance Theory as an alternative to representationalist accounts.

Abstract

Abstract Most philosophical theories of consciousness account for it in terms of representation, the bulk of the debate revolving around whether (suitably) representing something is sufficient for consciousness (as per first-order representationalism) or some further (meta-)representation is needed (as per higher-order representationalism and self-representationalism). This chapter explores an alternative theory of consciousness, one that aims to explain consciousness not in terms of representation but in terms of the epistemically and metaphysically direct relation of acquaintance. The author calls this the Inner Acquaintance Theory of consciousness (IAT). Roughly, on IAT, what makes a mental state conscious is its subject being acquainted with it. The main goal of this chapter is to take some steps toward developing the details of IAT, illustrate its potential explanatory power, and put it forward as a plausible alternative to representational theories.

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