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The `Hard' Problem of Consciousness Is Continually Reproduced and Made Harder by All Attempts to Solve It

Rupert Read

Theory Culture & Society March 1, 2008 DOI: 10.1177/0263276407086791 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Citations 9
Key points Argues that the hard problem of consciousness is an artifact of scientific approaches, and that cognitivist efforts to solve it are the very disease they claim to cure. Proposes a Wittgensteinian dissolution as an alternative to hopeless cognitivist solutions.

Abstract

I argue that the so-called 'hard' problem of consciousness ' the problem of how consciousness is possible at all, and how it 'connects' with matter ' is only an artefact of the ways in which human scientists approach consciousness and (more generally) mind. Putting the point paradoxically but also quite precisely: the efforts to solve the mind'body problem, and this its latest variant form, are the very disease of which they take themselves to be the cure. I give examples drawn from sociology and from philosophy to support this claim, and then try to mitigate this vicious consequence of Cognitivism in both disciplines by offering a Wittgensteinian dissolution of the (pseudo-)problem as an alternative to (hopeless) cognitivist efforts to solve it.