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Reductionism by default: how implicit metaphysical assumptions influence psychiatric practice

D. Kolomytsev

Konsulʹtativnaâ Psihologiâ i Psihoterapiâ December 22, 2025 DOI: 10.17759/cpp.2025330408 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Cross-sectional survey Peer reviewed
Sample size 120
Population Practicing psychiatrists, including residents and early-career specialists
Key findings Biological reductionist positions dominated among surveyed psychiatrists (69.1%), yet 40% of the sample held views incompatible with physicalism, and many showed contradictory or eclectic attitudes. The authors report only a weak link between philosophical views and clinical attitudes, arguing that clinical decisions are driven by systemic constraints, educational standards, and pragmatic choices rather than philosophical reflection.

Abstract

Context and relevance. Modern psychiatry exists in permanent conceptual crisis rooted in the "hard problem of consciousness". This crisis manifests clinically through a progressive decline in phenomenological analysis and the dominance of unreflected reductionism, often masked by pragmatism and clinical consensus.

Purpose: To conduct preliminary mapping of worldview positions among practicing psychiatrists regarding key philosophical issues in psychiatry and to develop a methodological framework for their further study.

Methods: A cross-sectional anonymous online survey of 120 practicing psychiatrists (including residents and early-career specialists) was conducted using an original questionnaire designed to identify both explicit and implicit attitudes. Analysis included descriptive statistics, hierarchical cluster analysis (Ward's method), and link analysis using Pearson's χ² with Bonferroni correction.

Results: The study revealed internal contradictions and eclecticism in worldview positions. While biological reductionist positions dominated (69.1%), a significant proportion of respondents demonstrated contradictory attitudes, particularly widespread implicit functionalism and views incompatible with physicalism (40% of total sample. The research also shows a weak link between philosophical views and clinical attitudes, indicating that clinical decisions are determined not by philosophical reflection but rather by systemic constraints, educational standards, and pragmatic simplified choices.

Conclusions: The documented dominance of unreflected reductionism reflects psychiatry's systemic crisis and necessitates intentional integration of philosophical reflection into psychiatric education and clinical practice.