The Problem of Hard and Easy Problems
T. Baetu
Canadian Journal of Philosophy March 31, 2023 DOI: 10.1017/can.2022.46 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that none of the three proposed demarcation criteria—functional definability, the puzzle of the accompanying phenomenon, and first-person subjective data—can accurately discriminate between consciousness and mechanistically explainable phenomena, undermining Chalmers's claim that consciousness is uniquely hard. |
Abstract
David Chalmers advocates the view that the phenomenon of consciousness is fundamentally different from all other phenomena studied in the life sciences, positing a uniquely hard problem that precludes the possibility of a mechanistic explanation. In this paper, I evaluate three demarcation criteria for dividing phenomena into hard and easy problems: functional definability, the puzzle of the accompanying phenomenon, and the first-person data of subjective experience. I argue that none of the proposed criteria can accurately discriminate between the phenomenon of consciousness and mechanistically explainable phenomena.
Citations in the library
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