THE POTENTIAL FOR CONSCIOUSNESS OF ARTIFICIAL SYSTEMS
International Journal of Machine Consciousness December 1, 2009 DOI: 10.1142/s1793843009000190 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 25 |
| Key points | Argues that empirical limits prevent deciding whether type I potential correlates of consciousness are necessary for consciousness, making it indeterminable whether machines lacking neurons or hemoglobin are potentially conscious. Proposes that this problem invites responses such as suspension of judgment, liberal or conservative attribution, and a psychometric scale. |
Abstract
The question about the potential for consciousness of artificial systems has often been addressed using thought experiments, which are often problematic in the philosophy of mind. A more promising approach is to use real experiments to gather data about the correlates of consciousness in humans, and develop this data into theories that make predictions about human and artificial consciousness. A key issue with an experimental approach is that consciousness can only be measured using behavior, which places fundamental limits on our ability to identify the correlates of consciousness. This paper formalizes these limits as a distinction between type I and type II potential correlates of consciousness (PCCs). Since it is not possible to decide empirically whether type I PCCs are necessary for consciousness, it is indeterminable whether a machine that lacks neurons or hemoglobin, for example, is potentially conscious. A number of responses have been put forward to this problem, including suspension of judgment, liberal and conservative attribution of the potential for consciousness and a psychometric scale that models our judgment about the relationship between type I PCCs and consciousness.