CONSCIOUSNESS OR CONSCIOUSNESSES? MODELING FOR DISENTANGLING
International Journal of Machine Consciousness June 1, 2010 DOI: 10.1142/s1793843010000254 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that phenomenal consciousness and the qualia problem should not be identified with consciousness as a whole, and that different forms and functions of consciousness must be distinguished and explicitly modeled, using AI to separate inseparable aspects of human behavior and mind. Proposes that modeling phenomenal consciousness requires first modeling what it means to have a body and to feel it. |
Abstract
After discussing a possible contradiction in Sloman's very challenging intervention, I stress the need for not identifying with phenomenal consciousness and with the qualia problem. I claim that it is necessary to distinguish different forms and functions of and to explicitly model them, also by exploiting the specific advantage of AI: to make experiments impossible in nature, by separating what cannot be separated in human behavior/mind. As for phenomenal consciousness, one should first be able to model what it means to have a body and to feel it.