Kant on Pure Apperception and Indeterminate Empirical Inner Intuition

Kant distinguishes between transcendental apperception and empirical apperception (inner sense), but sometimes writes that 'I think' expresses an 'indeterminate empirical inner intuition' (IEI) that differs from the intuition produced by inner sense, which threatens his conceptual framework. The paper analyzes relevant passages, evaluates major interpretations of IEI, revisits pure apperception, and proposes that IEI is a ubiquitous, nonfocal, 'obscure' empirical inner intuition built into all nonintrospective conscious states. This reading accounts for the peculiarities of IEI and resolves a major mystery in Kant's theory of self-consciousness.

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Abstract

It is well known that Kant distinguishes between two kinds of self-consciousness: transcendental apperception and empirical apperception (or, approximately, inner sense). However, Kant sometimes claims that “I think,” the general expression of transcendental apperception, expresses an indeterminate empirical inner intuition (IEI), which differs in crucial ways from the empirical inner intuition produced by inner sense. Such claims undermine Kant’s conceptual framework and constitute a recalcitrant obstacle to understanding his theory of self-consciousness. This paper analyzes the relevant passages, evaluates the major interpretations of IEI, revisits the notion of pure apperception, and proposes an alternative reading: IEI is a ubiquitous, nonfocal, “obscure,” and empirical inner intuition that is built into all nonintrospective conscious states. This reading can successfully account for the peculiarities of IEI, resolving a major mystery in Kant’s theory of self-consciousness.