The Logic of the Chiasm in Merleau-Ponty's Early Philosophy

Abstract

The trajectory of Merleau-Ponty's career is often seen as a progressive development: he begins by analyzing scientific consciousness in The Structure of Behavior, complements that account with a phenomenological analysis of behavior as lived in Phenomenology of Perception, and then overcomes the "philosophy of consciousness" to which the earlier texts are committed in the turn toward an ontology of flesh in The Visible and the Invisible.Through close readings of Merleau-Ponty's engagements with Gestalt psychology in The Structure of Behavior, I argue that the immanent critique of Gestalt theory in that text already anticipates the chiasmic logic of flesh.This challenges the idea of a turn in Merleau-Ponty's thinking.I begin by outlining the elemental, carnal, and reversible status of flesh.With careful attention to his source materials, I then distinguish Merleau-Ponty's appropriations of Gestalt theoretical insights from his critical adaptations, defending three claims: (1) The Structure of Behavior borrows insights from Gestalt theorists that are undermined by their own, realistic ontology; (2) it modifies those insights to explicitly acknowledge the elemental status of nature; and (3) those modifications enable Merleau-Ponty to re-interpret Gestalt psychologists' empirical findings, outlining how consciousness must emerge from nature as both carnal and reversible.