Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī
June 3, 2023
Mohammadjavad Elahieasl, Mahdi Zakeri
Panpsychism holds that fundamental physical entities have conscious states, and one key argument for it is that consciousness cannot emerge from non-conscious matter. Galen Strawson argued that emergence is either true (wholly dependent on and deducible from the fundamental level) or brute (wholly dependent but not deducible), and both are impossible. This paper argues that Strawson’s dilemma overlooks a third type of emergence, found in C. D. Broad’s historical emergentism, where the emergent property depends only partially on the fundamental level via fundamental laws of nature (nomism). Under this view, emergent properties require both the base level and trans-ordinal laws, making emergence coherent and possible. The paper concludes that Strawson’s argument does not refute emergentism.
Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī
June 12, 2026
Siamak Abdollahi, Mansour Nasiri
A precise understanding of human nature requires a subjective and phenomenological perspective. The paper argues that subjectivism must adopt a holistic viewpoint to effectively counter eliminativism, which denies the reality of conscious experience. The authors propose 'Subjective Holism' as a framework, not a definitive solution, that treats humans as integrated complex systems. This approach clarifies how mental and physical states emerge as properties within the system, aligning with the intuition of considering oneself subjectively as a whole. It reframes the question of human nature to how a unified whole possesses qualia like insideness and uniqueness, which are exclusive to the subject's conscious experiences.
Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī
December 12, 2024
Siamak Abdollahi, Mansour Nasiri
The explanatory gap in consciousness—how unconscious matter becomes conscious—arises from physicalist and dualist viewpoints. This paper proposes that adopting subjectivism and holism, forming a theory of subjective holism, can either dissolve the problem entirely (maximum answer) or at least point toward the correct way to solve it (minimum answer). The argument suggests that by shifting perspective away from eliminativism and dualism, the hard problem of consciousness need not arise, offering a positive resolution to the mind-body problem.
Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī
December 12, 2024
Tayyebe Gholami, Andrea Altobrando
Mulla Sadra's theory of mind shares some concepts with Husserl's monadological-phenomenological reflections, particularly regarding the individual human mind and its relation to the body. However, a strict phenomenological methodology cannot accept the metaphysical implications Sadra draws about the mind's connection to the totality of existence, including a divine reality. Comparing Sadra's thought with Husserl's monadology illuminates aspects of the latter and highlights the limitations of a purely phenomenological approach to metaphysical questions.
Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī
August 6, 2024
Ralph Weir
Property dualism, a widely respected theory in the philosophy of mind, is incoherent as usually understood. The commitments that are meant to support property dualism actually lead to substance dualism. This argument supports David Chalmers' suggestion that the serious nonphysicalist options are various kinds of panpsychism and substance dualism. The paper offers an account of the substance/property distinction, argues against the existence of substrata distinct from substances and properties, and describes a new position called 'transcendent panpsychism'. It identifies reasons why philosophers of mind might have overlooked the incoherence of property dualism and reflects on the significance of this conclusion for developmental psychology.
Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī
August 6, 2024
Mahdi Zakeri
Panpsychism extends phenomenal consciousness beyond humans and animals, making it fundamental and ubiquitous in nature. Within panpsychism, micropsychism attributes consciousness to fundamental particles, granting them moral status and standing, yet this has no practical moral consequences and does not require behavioral change toward them. Macropsychism attributes consciousness to the cosmos and all physical objects, holding that the universe has moral status and standing; it requires acting to increase pleasure and decrease pain for all beings whose causes of pleasure and pain are known, including animals and plants, but imposes no moral obligations regarding inanimate beings.
Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī
August 6, 2024
Robert van Gulick
Subjective facts about conscious experience—the 'what it is like' aspect—do not refute physicalism. A combination of nonreductive physicalism and teleo-pragmatic functionalism not only accommodates such facts but predicts them. Conscious minds are self-understanding autopoietic systems, a view that helps explain subjective experience. Global Neuronal Workspace theory is evaluated for its ability to address the Hard Problem of consciousness, and an augmentation involving another sense of subjective facts is proposed, again drawing on the idea of conscious minds as self-understanding systems.
Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī
April 28, 2024
Nayerehsadat Mirmousa
Kant's transcendental self is the ground of temporal synthesis yet is itself outside time. This article argues that the transcendental self is not disconnected from time; rather, it is always "with" time. Time is the way the subject affects itself, making objectivity and synthetic a priori knowledge possible. The transcendental self, as pure spontaneity, constitutes objectivity through time, giving time to itself a priori. This constant companionship with time resolves the apparent contradiction: the transcendental self is not "in" time but "with" time, enabling all modes of time (persistence, succession, simultaneity) and guaranteeing the subject's transcendence through its finitude.
Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī
April 17, 2022
Nima Narimani
The author argues that the principle of Physical Causal Closure (P.C.), which holds that only physical causes produce natural events, is used by naturalist philosophers to argue against supernatural causation and God. However, the author contends that P.C. also undermines human mental causation and agency. The paper examines four physicalist approaches—anomalous monism, non-reductive physicalism, over-determination, and reductive physicalism—that attempt to reconcile mental causation with P.C. The author claims each approach fails, demonstrating that P.C. leads to absurd consequences and thus cannot serve as a valid premise for naturalism. Consequently, the best argument for naturalism fails and does not refute theism.
Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī
December 29, 2019
Stephen R. Palmquist
The author recounts a quasi-mystical experience while first reading Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, then explores similarities between Kant's theories and ideas associated with Paul Tillich. Drawing on Chris Firestone's book, the author examines Kantian roots of Tillich's concepts: God as the Ground of Being, faith as ultimate concern, courage as the proper response to anxiety from human alienation from the divine, cultural symbols that give faith historical expression, political forms as self-negating, and love as a gift requiring power and justice. The article considers whether Kant influenced Tillich more than Tillich admitted and whether the author's own affirmative interpretation of Kant's religion theory was influenced by prior reading of Tillich.