Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī
June 12, 2026
Siamak Abdollahi, Mansour Nasiri
What does it really mean to be human? In this context, “real” refers to the most precise comprehension of human experience from a subjective and phenomenological perspective. When exploring human nature in the realm of philosophy of mind, we confront not only the mind-body problem (a fundamental challenge in substance dualism) and the hard problem of consciousness (a hurdle for eliminativism)...
Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī
November 18, 2025
Yaser Hashemi, Ahmad Valiee, Mohammad Javad Asghari
Atheists have long advanced arguments against the existence of God, challenging the claims of theists. Among these, John L. Schellenberg has proposed an argument known as “divine hiddenness,” which has garnered significant attention from philosophers of religion. Therefore, the subject of this paper is to critique and examine this argument based on the ontological foundations of Avicenna, one...
Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī
December 12, 2024
Tayyebe Gholami, Andrea Altobrando
This article examines the theory of mind proposed by the esteemed Islamic philosopher, Mulla Sadra, through a phenomenological lens. We specifically focus on how Mulla Sadra’s framework addresses the question of the individual human mind and its intricate relationship with the body. While Mulla Sadra presents concepts that resonate with some of Husserl’s ‘monadological-phenomenological’...
Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī
December 12, 2024
Siamak Abdollahi, Mansour Nasiri
How does unconscious matter become conscious? How does our physical part, which lacks consciousness, have such a subjective quality? This is the explanatory gap in the problem of consciousness or the hard problem of consciousness which comes from a physicalist (eliminativist physicalism) point of view. From the opposite point of view, i.e. dualism, the mind-body problem has led to the problem...
Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī
August 6, 2024
Ralph Weir
Abstract: According a widely held view in the philosophy of mind, property dualism is a respectable theory whereas substance dualism need not be taken seriously. This paper argues that property dualism, as it is usually understood, is incoherent. The commitments that are meant to lead to property dualism actually lead to substance dualism. The argument presented here adds weight to David...
Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī
August 6, 2024
Robert van Gulick
The existence of subjective facts in the epistemic sense defined by Thomas Nagel’s famous article, “What is like to be a bat?”, might be taken to support an anti-physicalist conclusion. I argue that it does not. The combination of nonreductive physicalism and teleo-pragmatic functionalism is not only consistent with such subjective facts but predicts their existence. The notion that conscious...
Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī
August 6, 2024
Mahdi Zakeri
People usually think that phenomenal consciousness is unique to humans and animals, but panpsychism extends it to other beings and considers consciousness to be fundamental and ubiquitous in the natural world. This extension is the common claim of panpsychists and has ethical implications. Panpsychists differ from each other in the extent of extension of consciousness. Micropsychism extends...
Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī
April 28, 2024
Nayerehsadat Mirmousa
According to Kant, Synthesis is temporally structured. However, the "transcendental I" which serves as the foundation for temporal Synthesis, is out of time. In the analogies of experience, the "transcendental I" does not put into any moods of time (persistence, succession, and simultaneity). This may seem contradictory, as it raises the question of how the timeless "transcendental I" can form...
Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī
June 3, 2023
Mohammadjavad Elahieasl, Mahdi Zakeri
Panpsychism, as opposed to physicalism and dualism, offers a third way to explain consciousness. According to panpsychism, some fundamental physical entities have conscious states. One of the important arguments for this view is the refutation of the emergence of consciousness. According to emergentism about consciousness, the consciousness of human beings and other beings is a property that...
Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī
April 17, 2022
Nima Narimani
Great naturalist philosophers like David Armstrong, David Papineau, Jeagwon Kim, and others have argued that the best arguments for naturalism are based on Physical Causal Closure (in brief P.C). P.C that is a premise in these arguments implies that only natural/physical causes are responsible for natural events and supernatural/non-physical causes cannot have any effective role in the natural...
Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī
December 29, 2019
Stephen R. Palmquist
Stephen R. Palmquist* Received: 20/03/2019 | Accepted: 15/04/2019 After briefly recounting a strange, quasi-mystical experience I had while first reading Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, I devote most of this article to exploring various similarities between theories Kant developed and ideas more commonly associated with Paul Tillich. Hints are drawn from Chris Firestone’s book, Kant...