A Phenomenological Assessment of Mulla Sadra’s View of the Individual Mind
Tayyebe Gholami, Andrea Altobrando
Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī December 12, 2024 DOI: 10.22091/jptr.2024.11350.3128 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Mulla sadra Individual mind Substantial motion Consciousness Mind-body problem Teleology Husserlian monadology |
| Key points | Argues that Mulla Sadra's theory of mind resonates with Husserl's monadological phenomenology but that strict phenomenological methodology precludes accepting the metaphysical implications Sadra draws regarding the mind's connection to divine reality. |
Abstract
This article examines the theory of mind proposed by the esteemed Islamic philosopher, Mulla Sadra, through a phenomenological lens. We specifically focus on how Mulla Sadra’s framework addresses the question of the individual human mind and its intricate relationship with the body. While Mulla Sadra presents concepts that resonate with some of Husserl’s ‘monadological-phenomenological’ reflections, we argue that strict adherence to phenomenological methodology precludes acceptance of the metaphysical implications he draws concerning the individual mind’s connection to the totality of existence, including a presumed divine reality. Nonetheless, our comparative analysis with Mulla Sadra’s thought illuminates key aspects of Husserlian monadology and highlights the limitations of a rigorously phenomenological approach to purely metaphysical inquiries.