The existence of subjective facts in the epistemic sense defined by Thomas Nagel’s famous article, “What is like to be a bat?”, might be taken to support an anti-physicalist conclusion. I argue that it does not. The combination of nonreductive physicalism and teleo-pragmatic functionalism is not only consistent with such subjective facts but predicts their existence. The notion that conscious...
Abstract My aim in this chapter is to give an overview of the recent discussion in the philosophy of mind that will serve as a map in locating issues and options. I will focus in particular on three central and interrelated ideas: those of emergence, reduction, and nonreductive physicalism. The third of these, which has emerged as more or less the majority view among current philosophers of...
Intentionality and phenomenal consciousness are the two traditional defining characteristics of the mental. Paradigmatically mental states have both, and both serve to anchor our basic concept of what it is for to be mental. When I have a visual experience of my office laid out before me, my mental state is clearly about or directed at in the intentional sense. My experience is an experience of...