Skip to content

A Critique of the Argument for Panpsychism through Refutation of the Emergence of Consciousness

Mohammadjavad Elahieasl, Mahdi Zakeri

Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī June 3, 2023 DOI: 10.22091/jptr.2022.8277.2720 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Phenomenal consciousness Physicalism Emergence Panpsychism Galen strawson
Key points Argues that panpsychism, the view that some fundamental physical entities have conscious states, offers a third way to explain consciousness beyond physicalism and dualism, and that refuting the emergence of consciousness supports this view. Credits Galen Strawson with first arguing in detail in the contemporary era for panpsychism through this refutation.

Abstract

Panpsychism, as opposed to physicalism and dualism, offers a third way to explain consciousness. According to panpsychism, some fundamental physical entities have conscious states. One of the important arguments for this view is the refutation of the emergence of consciousness. According to emergentism about consciousness, the consciousness of human beings and other beings is a property that emerges at the non-fundamental physical level from the fundamental physical nonconscious level. In the contemporary era, Galen Strawson first argued in detail for panpsychism through the refutation of the emergence of consciousness.