Property Dualism Implies Substanc Dualism
Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī August 6, 2024 DOI: 10.22091/jptr.2024.10209.2989 (opens in new tab) via DOAJ
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractProperty dualism, a widely respected theory in the philosophy of mind, is incoherent as usually understood. The commitments that are meant to support property dualism actually lead to substance dualism. This argument supports David Chalmers' suggestion that the serious nonphysicalist options are various kinds of panpsychism and substance dualism. The paper offers an account of the substance/property distinction, argues against the existence of substrata distinct from substances and properties, and describes a new position called 'transcendent panpsychism'. It identifies reasons why philosophers of mind might have overlooked the incoherence of property dualism and reflects on the significance of this conclusion for developmental psychology.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Substance Properties Mind Dualism Physicalism |
| Key finding | Argues that property dualism, as usually understood, is incoherent and that its commitments actually lead to substance dualism. |
Abstract
Abstract: According a widely held view in the philosophy of mind, property dualism is a respectable theory whereas substance dualism need not be taken seriously. This paper argues that property dualism, as it is usually understood, is incoherent. The commitments that are meant to lead to property dualism actually lead to substance dualism. The argument presented here adds weight to David Chalmers’ suggestion that the serious nonphysicalist options are in fact various kinds of panpsychism and substance dualism. Along the way I offer an account of the substance/property distinction, argue against the existence of substrata as distinct from substances and properties, and describe a new position which I call ‘transcendent panpsychism’. I identify some reasons why philosophers of mind might have overlooked the incoherence of property dualism and finish with some thoughts on the significance of my conclusion for developmental psychologyAbstract: According a widely held view in the philosophy of mind, property dualism is a respectable theory whereas substance dualism need not be taken seriously. This paper argues that property dualism, as it is usually understood, is incoherent. The commitments that are meant to lead to property dualism actually lead to substance dualism.