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Olfactory Experience II: Objects and Properties

Clare Batty

Philosophy Compass December 1, 2010 DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00352.x (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Citations 34
Key points Argues that olfaction challenges vision-centered theories of perception, raising distinct issues about perceptual objects and properties that philosophers have yet to resolve.

Abstract

Abstract The philosophy of perception has been dominated by vision, with very little discussion of the chemical senses – olfaction and gustation. In this second entry of a pair on olfactory experience, I consider what olfaction has to tell us about two issues: (i) the nature of perceptual objects and (ii) the nature of perceptual properties and, in particular, the secondary qualities. Given the scant work on olfaction in the philosophical literature, my discussion not only surveys what philosophers have said about olfaction so far, but considers the most plausible views and/or most pressing questions in each area of inquiry.